The good, the bad and the ugly arguments for ditching the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by Grogan, Joelle
The	good,	the	bad	and	the	ugly	arguments	for
ditching	the	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights
One	of	the	most	contentious	pieces	of	legislation	to	be	put	before	Parliament	–	the	EU
(Withdrawal)	Bill	–	now	faces	scrutiny	and	probable	amendments	in	the	Lords.	From	a	human
rights	perspective,	writes	Joelle	Grogan	(Middlesex	University),	one	of	the	most	concerning
aspects	of	the	Bill	is	the	exclusion	of	the	European	Union	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	from	the
corpus	of	EU	law	to	be	incorporated	into	UK	law.	She	assesses	the	arguments	being	made	to
exclude	it,	concluding	that	the	only	plausible	explanation	for	rejection	of	Charter	rights	is
the	rejection	of	rights.
The	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	holds	the	same	status	as	the	EU	treaties	upon	which	the	entire	EU	legal
system	is	based.	It	has	become	the	primary	source	of	fundamental	rights	in	the	EU	under	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	The
proposed	excise	of	the	Charter	has	been	celebrated	as	the	removal	of	alleged	‘flabby	Euro-rights’	by	some
Brexiteers,	and	reviled	as	weakening	rights	protection	in	the	UK	by	NGOs,	lawyers	and	academics.	An	amendment
tabled	by	Labour	to	retain	the	Charter	was	defeated	in	the	Commons,	and	it	is	unclear	whether	the	Lords	will
again	try	to	add	an	amendment	ensuring	the	EU	Charter	survives	the	Bill.
The	good	argument:	‘The	Charter	only	operates	within	the	scope	of	EU
law,	so	is	not	relevant	post-Brexit’
The	EU	Charter	is	binding	on	all	EU	institutions	as	part	of	the	EU’s	constitutional	framework,	and	all	legislative
measures	must	comply	with	it.	The	Charter	applies	to	Member	States	only	where	they	are	acting	‘within	the	scope	of
EU	law’.	Simply,	this	means	that	if	a	provision	of	an	EU	law	of	any	status	(other	than	an	article	of	the	Treaties)
violates	a	fundamental	right,	it	will	be	held	invalid	by	EU	courts;	or,	in	the	case	of	national	laws	which	fall	within	the
scope	of	EU	law,	they	will	be	set	aside	by	national	courts.
The	good	argument	for	the	removal	of	the	Charter	in	the	EU	(Withdrawal)	Bill	is	that	the	Charter	is	designed	to
operate	only	within	the	scope	of	EU	law.	Therefore,	it	will	have	no	relevance	after	Brexit	as	the	UK	will	no	longer
operate	within	that	scope	of	authority.
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There	are	two	responses	to	this	argument.	The	first	is	that	the	Charter	will	continue	to	have	relevance	to	retained
law,	particularly	where	retained	EU	law,	or	pre-Brexit	UK	and	CJEU	case	law,	contains	explicit	reference	to	Charter
rights.	This	is	recognised	by	the	Bill,	Clause	5(5)	‘references	to	the	Charter	in	any	case	law	are,	so	far	as	necessary
for	this	purpose,	to	be	read	as	if	they	were	references	to	any	corresponding	retained	fundamental	rights	or
principles’.	The	complication	this	clause	aims	to	resolve	leads	to	the	second	response:	explicitly	excluding	the
Charter	in	the	interpretation	of	retained	law,	and	in	litigation	concerning	former	Charter	rights,	will	cause	significant
confusion	and	uncertainty	in	practice,	as	Courts	and	litigants	must	rely	on	the	ambiguous	authority	of	‘underlying’
rights	to	found	in	a	multiplicity	of	sources.
The	more	sensible	approach,	advocated	here,	is	to	incorporate	the	Charter	in	the	same	way	as	that	envisaged	for
directly	effective	EU	law,	and	then	leave	it	to	Parliament	to	determine	how	the	Charter	ought	to	be	adapted	and
reformed	to	post-Brexit	Britain.	The	removal	of	the	Charter	seems	anomalous,	particularly	where	the	justification
offered	is	that	‘the	Charter	only	codified	existing	rights’	and	that	the	same	level	of	rights	protection	will	be	guaranteed
post-Brexit.
The	bad	argument:	‘The	Charter	only	codifies	existing	rights’
The	main	justification	offered	for	the	removal	of	the	Charter	is	that	it	is	not	a	source	of	rights,	but	only	‘reaffirmed	the
existing	legally	binding	fundamental	rights,	in	a	new	and	binding	document’.	At	face	value,	this	is	a	non-sequitur.	If	it
were	true	that	the	Charter	serves	only	to	codify	rights	which	are	already	binding	on	actions	which	fall	within	its	scope,
then	this	would	be	a	reason	to	incorporate	the	Charter.	Like	having	an	index	to	a	particularly	complex	textbook,	the
UK	would	benefit	from	such	codification	as	an	easy,	and	accessible	source	of	rights,	listed	and	clarified,	for	the
interpretation	and	application	of	retained	law.	There	could	be	no	arguments	as	to	whether	a	right	did	or	did	not	exist
(as	we	may	imagine	will	likely	arise	in	future	litigation),	and	the	legal	certainty	for	individuals	and	businesses
promised	by	the	EU	(Withdrawal)	Bill	would	to	this	extent	be	guaranteed.	The	inverse	is	argued,	however:
codification	is	not	relevant	as	it	merely	(re)states	existing	rights.
We	should	question	the	assertion	that	the	Charter	only	codifies	existing	rights.	DExEU’s	Right	by	Right
Analysis,	intended	to	assuage	concerns,	asserts	that	rights	contained	within	the	Charter	will	continue	to	be	afforded
protection	in	three	ways:
(1)	through	converted	EU	law;
(2)	in	the	18	Articles	of	the	EU	Charter	which	‘correspond,	entirely	or	largely,	to	articles’	of	the	ECHR	(see	here	for	a
handy	diagram	distinguishing	the	ECHR	and	the	EU	Charter)	and	are	‘as	a	result,	protected	both	internationally	and,
through	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998	and	devolution	statutes’;	and
(3)	through	the	common	law	or	domestic	legislation.
Each	of	these	statements	are	either	untrue	or	misleading.
First,	we	might	wonder	how	converted	EU	law	will	provide	(equivalent)	protection	when	EU	remedies	are
systematically	removed:	the	right	in	Francovich	which	allows	for	damages	in	the	event	of	a	breach	of	EU	obligations
by	the	State	will	end	(Schedule	1,	4).	General	principles	of	EU	law,	including	recognisably	rule	of	law	principles	and
human	rights,	are	retained	in	domestic	law	(only	if	acknowledged	by	pre-exit	case	law)	but	given	no	right	of	action,
nor	is	any	court	or	tribunal	permitted	to	disapply	any	rule	of	law	or	quash	any	conduct	(Sch	1,	5).
Second,	it’s	confusing	to	assert	that	a	EU	Charter	right	can	correspond	‘entirely	or	largely’	to	a	right	within	the
Convention:	this	misstates	the	multiplicity	of	sources	of	rights	reflected	in	the	Charter,	that	a	right	being	‘largely’	the
same	as	listed	in	another	document	is	not	a	reassuring	statement,	and	it	also	omits	mention	of	the	36	other	Articles
of	the	EU	Charter.	(Ironically,	the	rationale	for	codification	was	exactly	to	provide	a	single,	clear	source	of	rights	to
avoid	reference	to	a	plethora	of	sources.)
Third,	the	common	law	or	domestic	legislation,	does	not	recognise	many	rights	now	sourced	in	the	EU	Charter.
(Assuming	this	not	to	legislation	related	to	EU	obligations,	as	in	the	Equality	Act	2010.)
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All	of	this	leads	to	two	essential	questions	–	if	these	rights	are	not	recognised	as	rights	elsewhere	in	EU	or	UK	law,
will	they	be	rights	after	Brexit?	And	how	does	this	guarantee	the	same	level	of	rights	protection?
The	ugly	argument:	‘Charter	rights	are	‘flabby	Euro-rights’	which	enrich
lawyers	and	are	part	of	a	‘Brussels	project’’
Some	accuse	the	Charter	of	containing	‘flabby	Euro-rights‘,	preferring	the	‘tried	and	tested’	European	Convention
which	enshrines	‘basic,	fundamental’	rights.		The	Charter	is	a	source	of	rights,	and	(importantly)	a	source	of
additional	rights	which	do	not	exist	in	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	or	in	the	common	law.	There	is
nothing	particularly	Euro-centric	about	these	rights,	and	they	can	be	relied	upon	by	anyone	–	EU	citizenship	is	not	a
condition.	Nor	is	it	surprising	that	rights	have	developed	as	times	have	changed.	Before	the	internet,	and	the	capacity
for	mass	collection	of	personal	and	sensitive	data,	there	was	no	need	to	recognise	a	right	to	data	protection.	The
prohibition	on	human	cloning	was	not	necessary	before	it	was	possible	to	do	so.
A	second	argument	for	the	removal	of	the	Charter	is	that	the	‘extra	layer	of	rights’	and	fees	they	bring	to	lawyers	will
be	removed.	As	a	first	point,	one	might	argue	that	current	provisions	for	legal	aid	do	not	support	that	assertion;	and
the	uncertainty	created	will	likely	lead	to	more	litigation	as	courts	are	called	upon	to	resolve	uncertainties.	Second,
and	more	importantly,	rights	are	no	more	for	lawyers	than	product	safety	standards	or	traffic	regulations	are.	They
exist	to	protect	individuals.	Most	of	us	will	benefit	from	invisible	rights	protection,	as	embedded	protections	serve	to
guarantee	good	administration	and	democratic	participation	and	governance.	It	is	the	minority	who	will	need	to
actively	litigate,	as	ultimately,	rights	are	most	valuable	to	the	most	vulnerable	–	for	example,	to	care	home	residents,
the	disabled	and	their	families,	and	victims	of	human	trafficking.
The	third	assertion	is	that	the	Charter	is	a	‘Brussels	project’	that	aims	to	take	power	away	from	Member	States.
Human	rights	were	recognised	by	judges	in	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	EU	(in	Luxembourg),	as	part	of	the
constitutional	framework	of	the	now-EU	in	1969.	This	arose	from	concerns	about	the	impact	of	solely	economic
considerations	for	market	integration	on	citizens’	rights	–	as	well	as	the	concerns	of	Member	States	that	what	is	now
EU	law	would	not	ensure	fundamental	rights	were	protected	effectively,	and	that	it	could	come	into	conflict	with
fundamental	rights	protections	guaranteed	by	national	constitutions.	The	Charter,	in	excellent	synopsis	here,	was
written	within	an	open,	democratic	and	transparent	process.	British	concerns	were	recognised	for	the	extension	of
the	jurisdiction	of	the	CJEU	were	addressed	in	Protocol.	Changing	its	status	to	become	the	source	of	fundamental
rights	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty	could	only	be	achieved	through	unanimity	among	all	EU	Member	States.	‘Brussels’	didn’t
have	a	vote.
A	right	with	no	remedy
The	arguments	–	the	good,	the	bad	and	the	ugly	–	for	the	removal	of	the	Charter	succeed	in	masking	the	most
important	operation	of	the	Charter:	the	removal	of	a	highly	effective	remedy	which	has	no	equal	in	the	current
framework	of	rights	protection	in	UK	law.	DExEU’s	Right	by	Right	Analysis	identifies	domestic	routes	of	challenge	as
judicial	review,	under	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998,	or	a	claim	under	the	common	law.	Executive	action	and
secondary	legislation	may	be	struck	down	under	a	successful	judicial	review	claim,	while	the	Courts	may	issue	a
declaration	of	incompatibility	where	it	not	possible	to	interpret	primary	legislation	in	a	manner	which	does	not	violate
a	right	under	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998.
The	Right	by	Right	Analysis	offered	an	example	of	how	remedies	will	continue	after	Brexit	under	the	Human	Rights
Act	1998.		Curiously,	the	example	given,	Benkharbouche,	epitomises	the	difference	in	effect	between	the	Human
Rights	Act	1998	and	the	EU	Charter.	The	UK	Supreme	Court	recognised	that	both	the	right	to	access	a	court	(Art.	6
ECHR)	and	the	right	to	a	fair	trial	and	effective	remedy	(Art.	47	EU	Charter)	had	been	violated.	In	the	event	of	this
unavoidable	violation	of	ECHR	rights,	the	Supreme	Court	issued	a	declaration	of	incompatibility	to	Parliament.
However,	as	the	provision	of	UK	primary	law	was	also	found	to	be	in	violation	with	EU	Charter	rights,	the	section	of
primary	legislation	could	not	be	applied	(though	this	is	not	the	same	as	it	being	‘struck	down’	or	declared	invalid).	
Evidently,	while	it	contains	interpretive	duties,	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998	does	not	provide	equivalent	levels	of
protection	as	are	guaranteed	by	the	EU	Charter.	This	will	be	a	significant	loss	for	effective	protection	of	rights	post-
Brexit	in	the	UK.
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Some	argue	that	too	much	fuss	is	being	made	over	a	Charter	for	a	few	rights	more.	For	all	the	concerns	raised	over
legal	uncertainty	arising	from	Brexit,	the	UK	will	hardly	turn	into	the	Wild	West.	However,	no	reasonable	argument
for	rejecting	the	Charter	has	been	given:	the	only	plausible	explanation	for	rejection	of	Charter	rights	is	the	rejection
of	rights.	In	removing	the	Charter	through	operation	of	the	EU	(Withdrawal)	Bill,	a	vacuum	could	be	created:	a	lack	of
certainty,	a	loss	of	protection,	and	a	silence	where	there	was	once	an	acceptance	and	commitment	to	protection	of
individual	and	fundamental	rights.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Joelle	Grogan	is	a	Lecturer	in	Law	at	Middlesex	University.
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